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The Warsaw Rising
In late 1943 the Russian Army crossed the Dnieper River and created a wedge between the German Armies in the Ukraine and Baltic.
‘The Warsaw Rising of August 1944 was but the last performance of a drama which was also enacted
in 1733, 1767, 1794, 1830 1846, 1848, 1863, 1905, and 1920. On each occasion, if asked what they were fighting for, their [Poles]
reply might well have been the same: for a few ideas…. Which is nothing new’ (Davis, 1981:37). This view almost demeans the careful
planning and courage of the Home Army and related activities associated with one of the largest secret armies in Occupied Europe.
The self-less courage and massive losses inflicted upon the Home Army makes it one of the largest battles fought by ill-equipped combatants whose inspiration
has kept future generations awe inspired. It lasted two months and saw 200,000 die and a city left in ruins while a complacent Russian Army watched from the
banks of the Vistula.
Prelude to the Warsaw Rising
Strategically, the German High Command had been expecting an attempt to breakout of Soviet held territory and Hitler ordered a stand to defend
Warsaw at all costs (Iranek-Osmecki, 1954; Bor-Komorowski, 1951; Ciechanowski, 1975). The possibility of a Soviet attack on the city had been foreseen
by the Home Army and the Government-in-Exile. Sikorski’s failure to settle the frontier problem had left a political stalemate steeped in deep recrimination in
Soviet-Polish relations (Ciechanowski, 1975). The inability to cooperate also stemmed from Stalin’s refusal to release details of the whereabouts of Polish
officers until the discovery of the Katyn Massacre in April 1943. Anders constant complaints about release of Polish personnel from the Gulags and
non-recognition of citizenship during the formation of the Second Polish Corps in the Middle East added to the impasse (Bor-Komorowski, 1951;
Ciechanowski, 1975; Davis, 1981). The constant debate about frontiers and the adoption of the ‘Curzon Line’ dragged on despite efforts by Churchill and
Roosevelt. In the autumn 1943 Bor-Komorowski was desperate for the Home Army to have diplomatic contact with the Soviets and was being pressurized
by Eden to accept the Curzon Line. Mikolajczyk’s saw this as an opportunity to co-operate and establish the recognition of the Home Army to secure weapons
and administrate the undisputed territories (Ciechanowski, 1975). Most political leaders saw the dispute as a major block to post war settlement and the
Government in Exile remained intransient to any agreement or rapprochement with the Soviets who remained suspicious of Stalin. Sosnkowski remained
concerned over Bor-Komorowski independence and the strategic value Operation Burza and its impact upon disputed territory. In addition he was more
concerned over the scope and free-range Churchill and Roosevelt had given the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe (Ciechanowski, 1975).
Operation Burza (Storm also sometimes called Tempest)
The Home Army issued orders to implement Operation Burza to harass the retreating Germans in almost all
districts despite not being granted combatant rights.
The plans for the Warsaw Rising were amended according to a constant updating by field intelligence. The
Soviets supported the AL and there were conflicts in
numerous operational districts, which forced Bor-Komorowski to concentrate operations in an area bordered by the Rivers Bug and Stochod and centred on the
town of Kowel (Iranek-Osmecki, 1954; Bor-Komorowski, 1951; Ciechanowski, 1975).
|
District |
Home Army Divisions |
|
Vilna and Nowogrodek |
1st, 19th and 20th |
|
Brest - Litovsk |
30th |
|
Volhynia |
27th |
|
Lvov |
5th |
|
Lublin |
3rd, 9th and 13th |
|
Bialystok |
18th and 29th |
|
Radom and Kielce |
2nd and 7th |
|
Warsaw |
8th, 10th and 28th |
|
Krakow |
6th, 22nd and 24th |
(Source: Iranek-Osmecki, 1954:173)
The Soviets supported by the AL were not to be trusted.
Local contact with the Soviet army often resulted in liquidation of leading field operatives,
particularly the Cichociemni or whole units disarmed and imprisoned in former concentration camps (Majdanek) or deported to the gulags in Russia once
action was completed. In operational districts like Volhynia the contact was in two fronts - harassing the Germans and avoiding the Soviets. In some operational
districts the Home Army were so successful that they controlled the area apart from some major towns. Arms dumps were captured and prisoners released
and in some cases members of the AK released from serving.
Members of the Home Army despite spearheading many battles in the run up to the liberation of Warsaw were barred from entering captured towns and cities as
this reduced the impact of Soviet propaganda. Those who did manage to escape and return to their secret camps were eventually surrounded and liquidated
(Iranek-Osmecki, 1954).
The Warsaw Rising
When the Soviet army reached the eastern outskirts of Warsaw and entered the district of Praga, the final stages of operation Burza were implemented.
On the 26th July the Government in Exile had formally asked the British Government for support (Foot, 1990). Churchill and Gubbins watched the unfolding
tragedy in an almost powerless state. The AK had remained throughout the war as an independent army with little support from the SOE. The Government in
Exile remained fiercely independent of British and American interference and the Polish section of the SOE (known as MP) was run by Colonel Perkins also
had need of special liaison group (EU/P) headed by Major Hazell to avoid duplication or strategic clashes (Marks, 2000). The complex relationship within the Polish community caused frustration for all. The geographic distance made operations almost impossible
to support even at the fall of Italy.
Many as a commander saw Count Bor-Komorowski out of his depth both politically and strategically (Foot, 1990). On the 1st August 1944 the order for the
Rising was made and Moscow Radio called for support. Soviet tanks were less than 12 miles away and Berling’s army was on the opposite bank of the Vistula
and gave limited support due to the orders of Soviet High Command. Berling was dismissed for sending over patrols to
assist the heroic AK actions against the
Germans. Appeals for arms were made and the SOE and the RAF did what little they could, but the flight was 900 miles from base and on the edge of
operational limits with dropping zones close to city limits and only a few miles from the Soviets. Requests for the Polish Airforce to fly to Poland together with an
airborne drop of the Polish Brigade were also out of the question (Garlinski, 1969). Specialist paratroopers who had been trained for operations in Northern
France (Operation Bardsea and Monica) were also withheld and kept at their base just outside Peterborough (Foot, 1990; Marks, 2000) such was the risk.
When 15 out of 16 Polish manned Halifax’s loaded with arms and munitions were shot down, Sir John Slessor, Commander of the Mediterranean forbade any
further flights (Foot, 1990). Weather, low drop altitude, constantly changing city territory and Anti Aircraft fire made it an extremely hazardous mission and could
not be compared to supplying the French Resistance prior to D-Day where the sites were in remote rural areas. Some surviving crew members actually walked
and hitched from crash sites back to Brindisi in Italy through Soviet and German lines. The Soviets under pressure from Roosevelt allowed just one flight, a group
of 110 B-17 US bombers to refuel at Poltava on Soviet held territory for a drop on 18th September 1944 (Garlinski, 1969).
The ground battle was desperate with selfless valour being displayed in street-to-street fighting (Davies, 1981). It is estimated there were
between 12 - 20,000 AK soldiers (up to another 75,000 people involved in auxiliary roles) committed to the fight against a well-armed and trained German
Army of 20,000 battle-hardened troops made up of SS and Wehrmacht units.
Although some units of the AL were involved in the action, the lack of tanks,
armoured cars and heavy calibre weapons meant their role made little impact upon the outcome. Bor-Komorowski’s hope that the AK could take and hold
Warsaw for the return of the Government in Exile was politically ill conceived. The Soviets had no intention of recognising the AK and its leaders. The Warsaw
rising and the annihilation of the resistance by the Germans sped up the ‘removal’ of a political obstacle for post war settlement. After 63 days of savage fighting
the city was rubble and the reprisals brutal. The RONA brigade led by Kaminski specialized in anti-partisan action was made up of the scum and deserters of the
Soviet army supported Oskar Dirlanger’s Brigade and other units in vile retribution.
Mass shootings in reprisal together with the burning of hospitals with staff and
patients was typical of the ‘clean-up’ operations. Women and children were tied too tanks as protection against ambushes. Approximately 550,000 inhabitants
were sent to a concentration camp at Pruszkow and another 150,000 used as slave labour while over 245,000 died. 93% of the city was uninhabitable and
featureless of landmarks. Wehrmacht sappers systematically demolished the city.
The Warsaw Rising gave Stalin the opportunity to remove a well-organized
army and paved the way for the imposition of a post-war puppet government. Those who did survive would be dealt with at the infamous trials and tribunals
where long-term imprisonment or execution was guaranteed.
Air-bridge Statistics
1st August - 2nd October 1944
|
Flights |
306 |
91 Polish 50 British 55 South African 110 American |
|
Drops |
192 |
149 over Warsaw
43 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods |
|
Dropped |
2154 containers 557 Packages |
1711 over Warsaw
443 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods
Total 239 Tons |
|
Success Rate |
742 Containers
381 Packages |
463 over Warsaw
279 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods
182 over Warsaw
199 over Kampinos and Kabacki woods
Total 88 Tons (36.8%) |
(Source: Garlinski, 1969)
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