Narvik 9th April to 8th June 1940
Popular belief holds that Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserübung) were invaded without warning on 9th April 1940. Hitler used the excuse for the need to create ‘protectorates’ from Soviet invasion rather than publicly divulge the strategic decision to deny the Allies an alternative foothold or ‘jump-off point’ into Europe. Hitler needed to protect convoy routes and deny the Allies an ability to encircle Germany. Both Royal families in Norway and Denmark were pro-British and although the Norwegian government was pacifist, claimed neutrality to avoid conflict. Vidkun Quisling’s (Nasjonal Samling) collaboration with the Nazis worried intelligence chiefs and journalists alike that ‘fifth columnists’ could form part of the plan in the invasion of France (Stafford, 2000). The Germans needed to secure safe transport and convoy routes of steel from Sweden and keep access to the North Atlantic free. In any event, much ‘activity’ by the Allies was centred on the ‘Phoney-War’ (drôle de guerre) with the Allied High Command placing much faith on the Maginot Line in northern France to contain the real German threat.
The Norwegian Campaign from April to May 1940 was an opportunity for the Allies to redeem their lacklustre strategies both at diplomatic, political and military fronts. Indeed, Prime Minister Chamberlain (Turner, 1961 cited in Davies 2006) concluded Hitler had ‘missed the bus’ as the Allies sat pensively waiting. Overall, nine divisions had been earmarked for the campaign centred on naval and troop landings at Narvik (Davies, 2006). Denmark had fallen in a day. The Norwegian invasion by Germany had been a combined operation between the Kriegsmarine based in Bremarhaven, the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht supplying paratroopers and specialist Alpine troops from Austria. The invasion had set sail on the 6th April 1940 with the fleet heading for key ports of Trondheim, Bergen, Kristiansand and Narvik. In the Oslofjord the resistance was short but fierce with shore batteries sinking the Blücher (one of Germanyís most modern cruisers) with about half the invasion force on board and severely damaging the pocket battleship Lüzow. Paratroopers took the city of Oslo as the Luftwaffe bombed strategic targets, which paved the way for the completion of the invasion of southern Norway.
Battle Group 1 had set sail for Narvik consisting of ten German destroyers led by the flagship Wilhelm Heidkamp. On the morning 9th April the Germans landed troops on Ofotfjord and Herjangsfjord, which controlled access to Narvik and captured the supply base at Elvegaardsmoen. Spotted by the Norwegian navy, the Germans used the might of Wilhelm Heidkamp in a standoff to negotiate a peaceful outcome. Under the command of Captain Willoch, a small fleet of coastal defence ships blocked access to Narvik enabled the Norwegian destroyer Norge to prepare her guns and shore batteries to fire. Out-numbered and outgunned, the Norge was sunk along with the coastal defence ships.
The Polish Contribution
On 23rd April 1940 The Polish units earmarked for the Narvik campaign were under the command of the French Army’s 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade who embarked at Brest to fanfares and the playing of national anthems. The French expiditionary force boarded the SS Colombie, SS Clemenceau and SS Mexique heading up the Channel (La Manche) for Greenock on 24th April 1940 (French Convoy FP.3). The Polish Independent Highland Brigade (Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców), commanded by Gen. Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko, embarked onto SS Providence, a fast passenger liner and SS General Metzinger, which belonging to France under war reparations. Shortly after departure, SS General Metzinger was damaged in a collision in St. Georges Channel off Ireland on her way to Greenock. SS General Metzinger would later be bombed by the Luftwaffe and subsequently beached at Le Havre during troop evacuations in Operation AERIAL. SS Providence survived the war as a troop ship and mail courier and was scrapped in 1951 (https://polandinexile.com/article/the-polish-navy/).
The French expeditionary force under the command of General Antoine Béthouart had sought two Polish Infantry Divisions (Panecki, 1991), artillery units and an armoured unit with accompanying engineers and signals units making a total of 9,000 men committed to the expeditionary force (TNA HS4-162). The availability of units was created through the cancellation of the ‘Finnish Project’ in February 1940 (Borkowski, 1991) (https://polandinexile.com/article/the-polish-army-in-france-2dsp-internment-in-switzerland-1939-1940/). The Polish units making up the Polish Independent Highland Brigade consisted of Podhale Autonomous Hunter Brigade (aka Northern Brigade/ Chasseurs du Nord), a mountain infantry unit that included Polish diaspora living in France and commanded by Col. Józef Kobyłecki. The Carpathian Autonomous Hunters Brigade, made up of 6,000 troops who had escaped to France through Hungary was commanded by Col. Benedykt Chłusewicz.
The Polish Independent Highland Brigade were transferred to the French convoy (FP.3) which departed Greenock 07.00 on 1st May. SS General Metzinger had been replaced by the troopship SS Ville d’Alger, andSS Providence had replaced by SS Monarch of Bermuda and escorted by HMS Atherstone and Warwick with the French destroyers Epervier and Foudroyant accompanying them. Patrol vessels HMS Jason and Gleaner from the 3rd Anti-submarine Strike Force covered their route to an assembly point.
The British and French forces attempted to retake Narvik between 15th April and 8th June 1940 in Operation RUPERT which was occupied by 2,000 troops from the 139th Gebirgsjägerregiment and the sea forces of Gruppe. I, commanded by Kommodore Paul Bonte. The town had been surrounded, and the Norwegian 6th Division yielded their positions in their surrender.
Battle commenced when ORP Orzel sunk the Rio de Janeiro in Oslofjord after shadowing the German ship laden with troops on 8th April 1940. Orzel surfaced at 11.12 hours some 1,200 meters from the suspicious Rio de Janeiro and ordered it to stop and be searched. On ignoring the order to launch a boat, machine gun fire prompted compliance, but once the order to abandon ship within fifteen minutes was given, the Orzel waited and after repeating the order, torpedoes were fired sinking the ship. Debris indicated military personnel were on board and the purpose was for the invasion of Norway.
At the first naval battle at Narvik, the Royal Navy had entrapped the German fleet that was low on fuel and ammunition. At the first engagement outside the harbour the Germans were surprised and the RN sank Wilhelm Heidkam and Anton Schmidt, leaving the Diether von Roeder heavily damaged. The garrison had been engaged with shelling from the fleet before leaving the fjord. While putting to sea, 3 German destroyers from Herjangsfjord under the command of Erich Bey engaged the fleet with further support from 2 more destroyers emerging from Ballangen Bay under the command of Commander Fritz Berger. British destroyers HMS Hardy and Hunter were sunk with HMS Hotspur severely damaged by a torpedo attack and before entering the North Sea managed to destroy supply and munitions shipping.
In the second naval battle, a flotilla of 9 destroyers and the aircraft carriers HMS Furious attempted to take advantage of the fuel and munitions shortage suffered by the Germans. On arriving on 13th April, the German forces were in poor shape. The second battle saw 3 German destroyers sunk by HMS Warspite with other ships scuttled or destroyed. The main Allied invasion was aimed at Narvik with the Norwegian’s being pressurized to lend support overland through Bjørnefell. From 14th April the British forces landed 3 battalions and spread out to cover the fjord and approaches from the southwest at Nordland. The French Expeditionary forces landed on 28th April and were deployed at Ofotfjord with the Poles arriving on the 9th May 1940.
The command and co-ordination structure at Narvik was in the making of a disaster. Poor communication and control between the British, French and Norwegians meant a clear strategy for the invasion of Narvik was weak and divided. The options were for a seaborne assault or a more cautious overland attack. Delays and a slow response by the Allies had enabled the German garrison to improve their positions in readiness for the attack. While the Norwegians made good progress in their mountain campaign, French troops advanced up the Laberg valley with the British bogged down in Ofotfjord due to poor equipment and lack of training. Indeed, Major-General Mackesky advocated waiting until the snow melted.
The Polish Destroyer Division consisted of Burza, Blyskawica and Grom with the fleet being commanded by Komandor Porucznik S. Hryniewiecki had left Harwich via Scapa Flow for Norway escorting troop ships or in action off the Lofoten Islands and Narvik. On 3rd May Burza landed French alpine troops on Graatangend Fjord while Grom and Blyskawica shelled German positions. Sadly on 4th May Grom was sunk during a heavy air attack.
Eventually an amphibious attack led by the French Foreign Legion under the command of General Béthouart, was launched on 12th May (Operational Order No.38) with naval bombardments for support to retake Narvik and its peninsula. Bjerkvik fell and the French marched towards Elvegardsmoen forcing the Germans to retreat.
The Poles disembarked on 5th May 1940 at Tromsø and Harstad and were soon to be redeployed within the area. Gen. Zygmunt Bohusz-Szysko, a career officer who commanded the Polish Independent Highland Brigade began deployment of the Polish troops. One battalion joined the French holding the area Bjerkvik-Öyjord, one battalion remained in Harstad with battalions sent to Ballangen and Salangen between 13th and 14th May 1940 (Borkowski, 1991; McGilvray, 2017). The route march was unopposed, but heavy spring snow made the route difficult even for Alpine trained troops. Along the route detachments were left at Haugen to protect the left flank, the right flank was protected by detachments left at Meby with a detachment left at Gjeisvik to protect the rear with two companies positioned in Öyjord to hold and secure that area (McGilvray, 2017). Between the 15th and 16th May a Polish battalion was sent to relieve the 2nd SWB and the 12th Chasseurs Alpins based in Akenes peninsula.
Gen. Zygmunt Bohusz-Szysko’s HQ was located at Borkenes, while the 1st Polish Demi Brigade was at Skjomnes with the 2nd Demi Brigade was at Sjovien.
The Narvik Campaign – French & Polish Positions
Source: Bałuk (1995)
A Hurricane Fighter squadron had arrived on 26th May to support the forces, but after an abortive attempt to base them at Skaanland were sent to the airfield at Bardu Foss to be with the Gloster Gladiator squadron and in effect rendered them ineffective.
The Polish Independent Highland Brigade was equipped to cope with Alpine warfare with snow equipment and sufficient food and ammunition to last three days with resupply scheduled for the night of the 10th to 11th May from Harstad. The 2nd Battalion 1st Demi-Brigade was to move from Melvik-Nordvik area to Ostervik on the northern shore of Ofotfjord (McGilvray, 2017). On reaching Ostervik-Trondviken and Bjerkvik the Poles reconnoitred the area for German defensive emplacements and prevent enemy landings (McGilvray, 2017). On 11th May at 2100 hours, a motley flotilla of local craft headed for Bogen-Lenvik with a resupply of ammunition on 12th May which enabled the flotilla head for Bjerkvik. It was hoped this action would reverse the shortcomings of operations RUPERT, SICKLE and MAURICE Force which took place earlier in the campaign where the lack in co-ordination, military and political interference, particularly by Churchill (Fair, 1987) also hindered the defective command (Brown, 1994; de Lee, 2003) against a superior land war by the Germans whose integration of land, sea and air power became a pivotal moment (Corum, 1998; Çinar, 2022). The spring snow and lack of roads made access to Bjerkvik almost impossible and required the assistance of the Norwegian ski-troops despite being equipped with snow shoes. Bridges in the area had been destroyed making any attempt to traverse the landscape, hoever they completed the journey in sixteen hours (McGilvray, 2017). Bjerkvik had been almost destroyed and the Poles managed to take over the vacated fortifications and mop up the weak German opposition. In the distance the battle for Narvik had begun.
On the 12th to 13th May 1940, the Poles and French Expeditionary Force engaged German patrols on the Bjerkvik and Öyjord road that enabled on the next day for the 2nd battalion of the Polish Independent Highland Brigade to be relieved by the 14th battalion Chasseur Alpin with the remainder of the Poles in Bjerkvik to prepare for embarkation to the Ankenes peninsula. The operational area was now divided into two: Ankenes to the west Aefjord was covered by the Independent Highland Brigade, commanded by Gen. Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko and the second area was from the Bjerkvik under the command of Col. Raoul Magrin-Vernerey (aka. Ralph Monclar) of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Free French Forces (FFL).
On 16th to 17th May 1940, the 1st Podhalian Demi-Brigade, commanded by Col. Benedykt Chłusewicz relieved the combined British and French forces based on the Ankenes peninsula. Later the 4th Reserve Battalion reinforced the troops holding the area and was led by Maj. Arnold Laskowski. The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Michał Maćkowski remained based in the Ballangen area with the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Col. Władysław Dec took up positions at Melik and Sørvik (McGilvray, 2017). Units of the 1st Podhalian Demi-Brigade defended the ridge running from the village of Baetberget through Hills 295, 405, 677 and 734 until 27th May. On 22nd to 24th May 1940, the reserve 4th Battalion was transferred from the Tjelbotn area to the Ankenes peninsula via Skjomnes.
Initial duties were to hold positions and carry out intensive reconnaissance patrols, mapping out the German positions and strength. To get to their positions, twelve hour marches in difficult terrain was typical of what faced the Poles. Chłusewicz’s 4th Battalion carried out a reconnaissance patrol during the night of 27th May 1940 through secretly leaving Mattisjorden and encircled the Germans from the south. The battalion marched for 12 hours and reached Iverdalryggen Hill in the early hours on 28th May 1940 to attack the rear of the fortifications on Hill 606, however the attack signal was never given (McGilvray, 2017). Observation indicated the Germans were retreating from their positions, so the attack commenced, and Hill 606 was captured with the 1st Battalion’s hard-fought win to capture Hill 773. The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion were accompanied by a heavy machinegun platoon ascended Hill 773 towards Beisfjord and reached the Lakselven Valley exhausted and could not follow up on the success of the 4th Battalion who were trying to block the escape of German troops through Beisfjord towards the Kvanta Pass and onto Sildvik with the operation abandoned. On 29th May 1940, the 1st Battalion entered Beisfjord before moving further east into the Kvanta Pass where there was little resistance (Borkowski, 1991; McGilvray, 2017; Dalmo, 2023).
Col. Władysław Dec also launched his attack on 28th May 1940 from Skjomnes to clear Ankenes of German troops. A 20-minute barrage softened up the defences with the attack led by the 3rd Company and supported by light tanks which ground to a halt. The 3rd Company fought hard until reaching the south-west outskirts of Ankenes where upon the Germans countered with heavy machine-gun fire and mortars (McGilvray, 2017; Dalmo, 2023). The German counterattack went through as a wedge between the 1st and 3rd Company with a high casualty rate that resulted in their withdrawal at 03.00 hours in the morning of the 29th of May 1940. The Germans re-took Hill 295 and broke Dec’s command and communication systems. To avoid a rout, the 3rd and 4th Battalion moved forward from the Brigade’s rear and took up attack positions on the southern and western slopes of Hill 295. Three attempts were made to dislodge the Germans that proved impossible and despite this, the Germans vacated Hill 295 and the Ankenes peninsula. During the morning of 29th May 1940, the Polish 3rd Company entered Ankenes without encountering any German forces.
Also, on 29th May 1940, the 1st Company began its attack on Hill 295 towards Haugen at 02.00 hours with support from heavy machine guns. The attack was halted until dawn and in the meantime the Germans had vacated their positions. The 2nd Company was on the right flank and effectively used supporting fire from the 2nd Demi-Brigade’s heavy machine gun and mortar platoons with additional support from a British howitzer battery. The Poles broke through and captured Nyborg opposite Narvik. From here, the Poles attacked Germans fleeing along the Nyborg-Fagernes route to escape.
The occupation of Beisfjord secured the eastern flank and accelerated the German defeat of the Narvik peninsula and clearing of the Ankenes. On 30th May 1940, the Poles received orders that an attack on the Hunddalen via Sildvik was being planned (McGilvray, 2017; Dalmo, 2023). Hunddalen was at the end of the Ofotfjorden on an important railway line crossing into Sweden where Gen. Eduard Dietl who commanded the German 3rd Mountain Division held his reserves. The entire 1st Demi-Brigade in Beisfjord prepared for the battle. The 2nd Battalion were exhausted and partially withdrawn form combat duties. The 3rd Battalion was transported to Salangen by ship which was located on the north shore of the fjord and to protect the airfield at Bardufoss.
Unbeknown to the Poles, the Allies had received secret orders on 24th May 1940 (Operation ALPHABET) to withdraw from Norway (Dalmo, 2023) before the final assault to liberate Narvik which would then be used as the evacuation port (Borkowski, 1991). The Norwegians were running low on munitions and the announcement of the withdrawal on 1st June was a bitter blow to the Norwegians who faced few alternatives. Due to a communications error, the Polish 1st Battalion ignored plans to abandon northern Norway and with the help of the 13th Demi Brigade FFL moved their defences further east of Narvik (McGilvray, 2017) towards Hills 675 and 660 which eventually covered the evacuation of the whole brigade.
Col. Władysław Dec was ordered to move into the east of Beisfjord-Sildvik area and attack the rear of Dietl’s 3rd Mountain Division and its reserves close to the Swedish border proved ineffective for several reasons: the three companies were distributed in a shallow, linear grouping of units with howitzer’s distributed amongst them. The direction taken was poor in terms of German positions. The location of the reserves who the lacked experience of mountain warfare, made progress slow (Borkowski, 1991). Gen. Zygmunt Bohusz-Szysko was known to alter or ‘interpret’ General Béthouart’s orders adding to the confusion despite Dec’s plans being approved by Bohusz-Szysko (McGilvray, 2017) where the general distrust of the Norwegians and quality of local intelligence gathering was poor (Rohwer, 1991; Brown, 1994). The 3rd Company’s defeat and the fear of a German breakout of the Ankenes slowed the operation down further and crippled by fatigue, progress was slow. The terrain and lack of mountain warfare experience had a major impact on the operation (Borkowski, 1991; McGilvray, 2017). Their orders to clear the mountains north of Bjerkvik and the Oijod Peninsula would have British destroyers pounding positions to assist in the transiting of the area.
The final push for Narvik started on the night of the 27th – 28th May 1940 led by a naval flotilla bombarding German positions and would land troops from the scarcely available landing craft. Reports indicated Germans were evacuating towards Beisfjord with the French forces capturing 200 Germans, leaving the area of the Forsneset headland south to Fagernes free of German occupiers. Polish units struggled against the well dug in German positions in the surrounding mountainsides and limited air support meant Polish units’ ability to take strategic positions such as Hill 643 and 773 required Bohusz-Szysko to rethink their objectives. Chłusewicz was ordered to Beisfjord to relieve a French Battalion while Kobyliński was ordered to attack Hill 650. With the surrounding hills insecure, the evacuation was under threat. Eventually Hill 773 was taken by Capt. Brymor-Jones company of the 2nd South Wales Borderers who were part of the original RUPERT Force. The Germans retreated and remained hidden in the local countryside. While the Royal Navy pounded key targets, Polish units pushed hard to capture Hill 295, the terrain seemed to be defeating their plans since there was little cover and the assault came unstuck. Hill 295 was eventually captured to great heroic losses. In some places, the advances inadvertently bypassed strongholds leaving the rear of Polish units at risk.
Gen. Bohusz-Szysko
Source: DCMNY
Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion which had been transported to Salangen by ship, sent out reconnaissance patrols along the Swedish border. During the capture of Narvik, the 3rd Battalion would have provided badly needed reserves but instead were sidelined and were evacuated on 2nd June (D1), 5th June (D3), 6th June (D5) leaving behind almost all their artillery and munitions for passage back to the Britain to bolster defences there.
The French had captured Narvik, Ankenes, Fagernes and Forsneset and advanced towards Sildvik (McGilvray, 2017) by the end of May 1940. The Polish forces fought a hard battle to secure the perimeter, and the British and French naval bombardments were effective against the German positions in difficult terrain while protecting the FFL landings in Narvik with Norwegian support to enable the evacuation to start. These actions were part of disguising the evacuation and final destruction of port and rail transportation networks.
It is incredible to think that in late May 1940, the Poles took on some of the toughest assignments and showed great courage while in the background senior officers knew of the evacuation plans – all for nothing?
Operation Alphabet
British High Command had already decided to tactically withdraw with significant loss. On 3rd June 1940 German cipher traffic made a sudden upsurge. It indicated a substantial fleet of Kriegsmarine entering the Baltic from Kiel (Budiansky, 2000) with Germany determined to take Norway and once they controlled the skies, the landings at Narvik were doomed.
Despite the capturing of Narvik, the decision to evacuate the Allied troops was driven by the threat of invasion into France and the Low Countries through the German operations GELB and SICHELSCHNITT. The evacuation of Bødø started on 29th May 1940 with embarkation of with two battalions of 24th Guards Brigade on 31st May 1940. The evacuation was overseen by Lt. Col. W.D. Faulkner and Brig. C. Mc. V. Gubbins. The road to Narvik was at this point clear of any major obstacles and exposed the airfield at Bardufoss which lay under thick fog hampering any air support.
The staged evacuation from Narvik was designed to minimize risk to the Norwegian forces north of Bjornefell where the 6th Norwegian Division comprising of 5 divisions held the border with Sweden.
With 24,500 troops to evacuate, the convoys that had supplied troops and stores were exposed to German naval movements, so the fleet carriers HMS Ark Royal and HMS Glorious were despatched so that some air cover could be provided to protect the evacuation. A small fleet made up of a light cruiser HMS Coventry and ten destroyers protected the evacuation. Harstad was evacuated first and then proceeded to Narvik. On the 7/8 June, 4,700, 4,900, 5,100, 5,200 and 4,600 men were embarked on vessels assembled off Harstad with ht ecapacity of the landing craft and barges limited to around 280 troops. The first convoy, comprising British SS Monarch of Bermuda, Polish SS Batory and SS Sobieski, British SS Franconia, SS. Lancastria and SS Georgic, departed Harstad on 4 June, accompanied only byHMS. Vindictive, and reached Scapa Flow on 8 June without loss.
On 7th June 1940 the second convoy departed. It comprised of British SS Oronsay, SS Ormonde, SS Arandora Star, SS Royal Ulsterman, MV Ulster Prince, MV Ulster Monarch and SS Duchess of York, escorted by the light cruisers HMS. Southampton and Coventry. The fleet also included the destroyers Beagle, Delight, Fame, Firedrake and Havelock which departed Harstad together with a slow convoy comprising the transports, oilers and armed trawlers.
The heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire departed from Tromsø with the Norwegian Royal Family. The fleet carrier Ark Royal was also available to to provide additional protection from the German Navy which had sent the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to intercept the evacuation convoys under Operation JUNO. The Germans had intercepted radio traffic and were aware of the evacuation (Flicke, ND). The elderly fleet carrier HMS Glorious after taking on board the last British aircraft, departed Bardufoss accompanied with two destroyers. The flotilla included sequestrated boats from Vestfjord and the transports SS Orama and SS Van Dyck lifting on 4, 5 and 6 June 15,000 men. Accompanied by cruiser HMS Vindictive, they sailed to one of the two rendezvous points 205 miles (330 km) off the Norwegian coast. They were then to sail for home as an organised group escorted by HMS Vindictive and destroyers. Prior to that HMS Glorious and two escorting destroyers HMS Acasta and Ardent, were sunk with the damaged Scharnhorst accompanied by the Gneisenau limped into Trondheim.
On 7 and 8 June 10,000 more men were embarked onto 7 more troopships, and by the morning of 8 June the embarkation had been completed. The first flotilla was met by the battleship HMS Valian accompanied by destroyers and arrived in the Clyde on 8th June at 01.00. The French flotillla that included the units of the Polish Independent Highland Brigade escaped via Scotland and arrived in Brest on 8th June just as Paris had fallen to the Germans. A small number of Poles arrived in Scotland and represented around a battalion strenght which would later become incorporated into Gen. Maczek’s First Armoured Brigade (Bałuk, 1995).
Narvik was secretly evacuated from 4th to 8th June due to mounting pressure upon the Allies to prop up the collapse of France and the urgent need for the fleet to support the evacuation of Dunkirk. The destroyers ‘bussed’ troops to the awaiting liners 112 Km off the Norwegian coast. The Independent Polish Rifle Brigade was evacuated on the night 4-5th June.
Both Burza and Blyskawica were sent south to France. ORP Burza was in action off Calais on 21st May shelling German troop concentrations in ‘delay action’ to cover troop withdrawals. Attacked by JU-87s Burza was hit and limped back to Dover before being sent to Plymouth for repairs.
The evacuation from Narvik and Dunkirk brought down the Chamberlain Government (Davies, 2006). Churchill (cited in Dickens, 1974:157) addressed the House of Commons of the key ship HMS Warspite:
‘The craven and inept authorities at the Admiralty took the risk and were very much relieved to find that there were no special traps of one kind or another in the fjordsÖ. What would have been said if she had been sunk? ‘Who was the madman who sent one of our most valuable ships into congested waters where she could easily fall prey?’ If you dare and fail it is murder of your sailors. If you are prudent you are craven, cowardly, inept and timid’.
It is true a small naval flotilla annihilated a larger superior German navy and undoubtedly delayed an attempt to stage the invasion of Britain. However, there were recriminations as reported in the London Gazette on 8th July 1947 (No.38011)
The remaining flotillas arrived in Scotland with no further incidents. With the late departure from Kiel of Operation JUNO on the 4th June, inadverently assisted the successful evacuation of Narvik and the Allies. JUNO was tasked to strike Harstad on the night of the 8th-9th June 1940 and were uncertain of how far the evacuation plans had progressed. The German fleet was ordered to attack any remaining ships which resulted in the empty SS. Orama being sunk along with a oiler Oil Pioneer and an armoured trawler approximately 300 miles NW of Trondheim by the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper. The hospital ship HMHS Atlantis was unharmed. The German fleet disengaged themselves from any further action due to the fact they could not refuel at sea and headed for Trondheim.
Epilogue:
The return of the French expiditionary force from Narvik would not have saved France. Belgium had already fallen at the end of May with Paris occupied and by the end of the month an armistace would shape the war for the next few years. Italy entered the war against France on the 10th June 1940, making the situation dismal for France and it was Charles de Gaulle’s radio broadcast on the 18th June calling for resistance that gave a glimer of hope. Although the Polish 1st Grenadiers and the 2DSP continued to resist Germany’s invasion, it was a hopless situation with the 1st Grenadiers surrendering and the 2DSP escaping to interment in Switzerland.
By contrast Gen. Maczek’s Tank Regiment and the Motorised Cavalry Regiment left for Paris on the 25th to 29th May on a 700km dash (Kurcz, 1943), a fact often forgotten. The mechanised Brigade was created with 2 tank battalions, a motorised cavalry regimemt of 2 Battalions, an anti-tank unit of 4 squadrons, a signals squadron, HQ staff and a police platoon. The 3rd and 4th Tank Battalions were left behind. They fought on the Marne front to the bitter end.
Operation DYNAMO between 26th May and 4th June 1940 based on the sands of Dunkirk enabled 338,226 BEF troops and 140,000 French and Belgian troops to be rescued. Operation CYCLE from the 10th to 24th June 1940 based on the port of Le Havre enabled a further 11,059 troops to be evacuated. The civilian evacuation (L’Exode) clogged transport netowrks as they fled south into the Vichy Government area that put a strain on its economy and resources to feed and house them.
Operation AERIAL which started on 15th June and completed by 25th June 1940 saw another 199,970 troops evacuated from France’s Atlantic ports.
Although billed as ‘Hitler’s First Defeat’ the sea battles played a vital role in the campaign indicating that the Norwegian waters were no longer safe for ore exports. The damage done to the Kriegsmarine successfully reduced the threat to the Allied navies (Thompson, 2015). While the occupation of Norway posed a threat to Atlantic and Northern convoys, the inflicted damage curtailed any invasion of Britain (Thompson, 2015). Dalmo (2023) concluded that the damage to the dock facilities would take years to replace and the security of the shipping lanes were compromised. The strategic importance of Narvik was nolonger of strategic importance since the Germans now had access to French mines in 1940.
However, the land battle was a muddle. The operational command was hampered by political meddling and excess direction towards a multiple of objectives with logistics given unreasonable deadlines where fragementry intelligence gathering and communicating it, added to the failure (Brown, 1944). The Polish forces on land and sea distinguished themselves (Borkowski, 1991) despite loss of human life and ships. The inabilty to clear the Ankenes peninsula and the losses suffered, boils down to the lack of armoured vehicles and artillery compounded by lack of air support (Borkowski, 1991). The ‘Phoney War’ was over and the politicians looked more closely at the Ribbontrop-Molotov Pact and its implications not only for eastern and central Europe, but also communist cells in France. General Béthouart was placed in an almost impossible postion with orders to secure Narvik while at the same time having received orders for the evacuation.
Another measure of inept planning and strategic thinking was the return of Polish troops to France. The surviving of the Polish Independent Rifle Brigade (some times called the Polish Podhalanska Brigade) returned to France from the Arctic operation at Narvik. They landed in Brest on 13th June 1940 to find that despite crippling losses of the 1st Grenadier Division covering the allied retreat, the PIRB were ordered to reinforce a non-existent French Army defending Brittany. To the north along the coast at Dunkirk an armada of little ships rescued around 340,000 troops between 25th and 28th May 1940. The order to sacrifice a combat experienced brigade and render it ineffective at the fall of France remains one of gross stupidity and incompetence and thereby denied Great Britain a ‘rich’ resource for training less experienced infantry troops in field-craft being rapidly assembled to fill the losses incurred by the BEF.
Selected References:
Bałuk, S. (1995) “Poles on the Fronts of World Wat II”, ARS, Poland.
Budiansky, S. (2000) “The Battle of Wits: The complete story of codebreaking in World War II”, Viking, UK.
Borkowski, M. (1991) “Polish Forces in the High North”, in “Narvik 1940: Five-Nation War in the High North”, in Rommrtveit, K (Eds), Forsvarsstudier, No. 8, Ch. 9, pp. 146-165.
Brown, C.L. (1994) “Allied Failure in the Norwegian Littoral, 1940 Operational Level of War Lessons for Today”, Naval War College, USA.
Çinar, B. (2022) “Operation WESERÜBUNG NORD: German Invasion of Norway 1940”, Aralik, Vol.6, No.2, pp. 670-713.
Corum, J. (1998) “The German Campaign in Norway 1940 as a Joint Operation”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.21, No. 4, pp.50-77.
Dalmo, K.H. (2023) “Kampen ved Narvik I 1940”, Nye blikk på andre verdenskrig i nord, Vol.69, No.1, pp.3-11.
de Lee, N. (2003) “Scandinavian Disaster: Allied Failure in Norway in 1940” in Sheffield, G., Till, G. (eds) “The Challenges of High Command. Cormorant Security Studies”, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, Ch. 5, pp.59-72.
Fair, J.D. (1987) “The Norwegian Campaign and Churchill’s Rise to Power in 1940: A Study of Perception and Attribution”, The International History Review, Vol.9, No.3, pp.410-437.
Kurcz, F.S. (1943) “The Black Brigade”, Atlantis Publishing co, UK.
Le Goyet, P. (1966) “Les Chasseurs à pied 1940 à 1945”, Revue Historique des Armés, 22e année, No. 2, pp.47-49.
Flick, W. (ND) “German Intercept Successes Early in World War II”, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-spectrum/german_intercept.pdf. (Accessed 23.11.2025)
Panecki, T. (1991) “Polish Destiny: From Westerplatte to Narvik” in “Narvik 1940: Five-Nation War in the High North”, in Rommrtveit, K (Eds), Forsvarsstudier, No. 8, Ch. 4, pp. 45-62.
Rohwer, J. (1991) “The fateful Decisions: Intelligence, Command and Technical Failure”, in “Narvik 1940: Five-Nation War in the High North”, in Rommrtveit, K (Eds), Forsvarsstudier, No. 8, Ch. 8, pp. 114-138.
Thompson, D.J. (2015) “The Norwegian Campaign: How Much Was the Kriegsmarine Worth?”, Canadian Forces College, National Defence, Canada.
Additional Resources:
Buchner, A and Ancker, J.W. (2020) “Narvik: The struggle of Battle Group Dietl in the Spring of 1940”, Casemate, USA.
Claasen, A. (2007) “The German Invasion of Norway 1940: The Operational Intelligence Dimension”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp114-135.
Corum, J. (2021) “Norway 1940: The Luftwaffe’s Scandinavian Blitzkrieg (Air Campaign)”, Osprey Publishing, UK.
Dildey, D.C. (2007) “Denmark and Norway 1940”, Osprey Publishing, UK.
Englert, J.L. and Barbarski, K. (1992) “Generał Maczek: I Żołnierze 1 Dywizji Pancernej”, Sikorski Institute, UK.
Haarr, G.H. (2009) “The German Invasion of Norway, April 1940”, Naval Institute Press, USA.
Jowett, P. (2022) “Narvik and the Norwegian Campaign 1940”, Pen & Sword, UK.
Meilinger, P.S. (2017) “Jointness and the Norwegian Campaign, 1940”, Air & Space Power Journal, Vol.31, No. 1, pp. 4+.
Merrikin Trimlet Glover, E. (2022) “The Mystery of Operation ALPHABET”,Austin Macauley Publishers, UK.
Selected Films and YouTube Videos
“Kampen om Narvik” (2022) Directed by Erik Skjoldbjærg with Kristine Hartgen, Carl Martin Eggesbø, Christoph Gelfert Mathiesen.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxBHAktsqLI – The Poles at Narvik, Norway 1940 – Alliert og alene (TV Miniseries 2015)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCk_5Zl3wu4 – Documentary hosted by PeriscopeFilm.
